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Legal Notes
Harold Dudley Greeley, Editor
SUBROGATION OF INSURER ON SURETY BOND

A recent decision by the supreme court of Florida (Dantzler Lumber & Export
Co. et al. v, Columbia Casualty Co., 156 Southern Reporter 116) raises several
questions of interest to practising accountants. All the following statements
are allegations made by the plaintiff, the Columbia Casualty Company; none
of them has yet been proved as true, but all were assumed by the court to be
true for the sole purpose of deciding whether or not plaintiff had stated a cause
of action.
The Dantzler Company was engaged in the lumber business at Tampa,
Florida. The Columbia Casualty Company insured the Dantzler Company
against embezzlements by certain of its employees, by a surety bond in the sum
of $10,000. One of those employees was the bookkeeper of the Dantzler
Company and he succeeded in embezzling $39,425.61, of which $1,670.09 was
taken in 1927, $4,716.62 in 1928, $15,670.70 in 1929, $8,693.20 in 1930, and
$8,675 in 1931.
During all of these years the books and accounts of the Dantzler Company
were being audited by a firm of public accountants. It was alleged that the
auditors were unrestricted as to the scope of their work and that they were
required to make complete and detailed audits, including the examination of
all cash transactions. The auditors certified in each of their reports for the
years 1927 to 1930 inclusive that “all record cash receipts for the year under
review were traced directly into the bank deposits and disbursements through
the bank account were verified by an examination of said cheques, invoices or
other supporting data on file.” The defalcations were accomplished by means
of cheques made payable, in effect, to bearer and it was alleged that if the audi
tors in 1927 had compared the cheques with invoices and other supporting
data, the theft would have been discovered, the bookkeeper discharged, and the
subsequent thefts, amounting to $37,755.52, prevented.
The Columbia Casualty Company paid the full penalty of its bond, $10,000
to the Dantzler Company. At that time it notified the Dantzler Company and
the auditors that the Columbia Casualty Company would make a claim against
the auditors for reimbursement of its loss, on the theory that it was subrogated
to the rights of the Dantzler Company against the auditors, and it warned the
Dantzler Company and the auditors not to make any settlement between
themselves without providing for the reimbursement of the Columbia Casualty
Company. It was alleged that notwithstanding this warning, the Dantzler
Company and the auditors did make a settlement between themselves for an
amount not disclosed to the Columbia Casualty Company.
Thereupon the Columbia Casualty Company brought an action against the
Dantzler Company and the auditors seeking to ascertain whether or not a
settlement had been made and if so for what amount, and for a decree by the
court that the Columbia Casualty Company be subrogated to the rights of the
Dantzler Company against the auditors and that the auditors be compelled to
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pay the casualty company such amount as might be found due. The defend
ants in the court in which the action was started asked that the action be dis
missed on the ground that the allegations did not state a cause of action.
That court refused to dismiss it and an appeal was taken to the supreme court
of Florida. The supreme court sustained the court below and consequently
the case will be tried unless some settlement is made out of court. Of the five
judges of the supreme court, one dissented in part and another dissented wholly
from the court’s decision.
Two principal questions were submitted to the supreme court, of which the
first was whether or not the allegations made by the plaintiff set forth facts
sufficient to show liability on the part of the auditors to the Dantzler Company.
If that question were answered in the negative, plaintiff’s case would fail, but
if it were answered affirmatively, then the second question would be considered:
Should the casualty company be subrogated to the Dantzler Company’s rights
against the auditors? If this second question were answered in the negative,
plaintiff’s case would fail; if in the affirmative, the case should be tried and the
amount of the auditors’ liability determined.
The court answered the first question in the affirmative, stating that the
allegations presented a case of gross negligence if not of legal fraud on the part
of the auditors. “ Public accountants and auditors hold themselves out to be
skilled and competent to perform the duties and services which they undertake
to perform as accountants and auditors, and they are bound in law to perform
such services in an accurate and skillful manner . . . they occupy a relation of
trust and confidence to their employer based upon the superior knowledge of
the business of accounting and auditing possessed by the auditors and ac
countants.” Doubtless no accountant will disagree with the court's conclusion
in that statement, however much some would prefer to have the practice of
accountancy described as a profession rather than as a business. Neither of
the dissenting judges disagreed with this part of the decision. Their disagree
ment was on the matter of subrogation.
The first point of legal difficulty arose in determining whether the Dantzler
Company’s right against the auditors was to sue for breach of contract or for
damages in a tort action for negligence. The court held that the right of
action would be one in tort for negligence, although an action could be brought
also for breach of contract. “The action here is not for mere non-performance,
but it is based upon an alleged breach of duty to skillfully perform and truly
report the condition of the accounts.” The court quoted from Smith et al. v.
London Assurance Corporation, 109 App. Div. 882, 96 N. Y. S. 820: “Where
public accountants were employed on the express agreement that they should
frequently check the defendant’s cash account . . . and they negligently and
willfully failed to do so, and on account of such failure its cashier was enabled
to embezzle large amounts of money, they were liable for the sums embezzled.”
In other words, the contract merely created the conditions which made the tort
of negligent performance possible, and notwithstanding the technical breach
of contract, an action in tort for damages due to negligence could be main
tained. This is a point of importance to accountants where the fee is small
and the loss from defalcation large, and the accountants claim that the client’s
remedy is limited to a recovery of the fee which constituted the consideration
for the contract.
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The court having found sufficient allegations to justify a trial on the issue of
negligence, then turned to the second question and decided that the casualty
company was subrogated to the rights of the Dantzler Company against the
auditors. The doctrine of subrogation is a creature of courts of equity, its
purpose being the doing of complete justice among all the parties, without
regard to form. It rests upon the maxim that one person should not be en
riched at the expense of another. The court quoted from 25 Ruling Case Law
1372: “One who has indemnified another in pursuance of his obligation so to
do succeeds to, and is entitled to, a cession of all the means of redress held by
the party indemnified against the party who has occasioned the loss . . . this
right of the insurer against such other person not resting upon any relation of
contract or of privity between them.”
The judge who dissented wholly from the court’s decision stated in his opinion
that he saw no right to subrogation in this case. He admitted that the casualty
company would be subrogated to any rights which the Dantzler Company
might have against the defaulter, but he would not allow it to be subrogated to
such rights against the auditors. He based this position chiefly on the ground
that there was no direct relationship between the contract of suretyship and the
contract between the Dantzler Company and its auditors. The Dantzler
Company was under no obligation to employ auditors, the contract made with
its auditors was for its own benefit and not for the benefit of the casualty com
pany, and the casualty company neither knew of the auditing contract nor
relied upon it in issuing its surety bond. “So far as the casualty company is
concerned, its liability and its loss would have been the same if the Dantzler
Company had never made a contract with (the auditors) and had never had its
books audited.” That statement, unfortunately, is true so far as the audit in
this alleged situation is concerned. Also, he objected to subrogation on the
further ground that it would deprive the auditors of their right to a trial by jury.
On this last point, the court held in effect that there was no right to a trial
by jury. The relief which the casualty company was seeking could be obtained
only in equity and the “court of equity, having acquired jurisdiction to deter
mine rights cognizable in equity between the parties, it will reach out and draw
into its consideration and determination the entire subject-matter, bringing
before it all the parties interested therein, and will retain such jurisdiction
until all matters involved in litigation between the parties or growing out of and
connected with the subject-matter of the suit are fully disposed of.”
The chief justice of the court, who concurred in part with the court’s decision,
dissented from the denial to the auditors of a jury trial. He contended that the
auditors were constitutionally entitled to a jury trial and that the casualty
company should be compelled, by subrogation, to sue the auditors in a court
of law where a jury trial could be obtained.
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